

The impact of economic Dualisation on party competition in Contemporary Europe

Dr. Paul Pennings

Associate professor

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

VU University Amsterdam

The Netherlands

Abstract

The demise of traditional established parties and the rise of new issues (often stemming from the New Left and the new populist right) indicate that new parties try to mobilize outsiders against the established parties. Will they be successful in the long run and replace the current established parties in parliament and government? This paper seeks to analyse the degree to which the insider-outsider divide impacts on the structure of party competition in Europe after 2002. It will be argued that, although an insider-outsider divide does exist, it has had a moderate effect on party competition. The reasons are that the group of outsiders is smaller than is often assumed and this group is hard to mobilise due to non-voting behaviour and indistinct policy preferences.

Keywords: Dualisation, party competition, voting behaviour, insiders, outsiders

1. Introduction

The demise of traditional established parties and the rise of new issues (often stemming from the New Left and the new populist right) indicate that new parties try to mobilize outsiders against the established parties. Will they be successful in the long run and replace the current established parties in parliament and government? This paper seeks to analyze the degree to which the insider-outsider divide impacts on the structure of party competition in Europe after 2002. In the literature we find two opposing views on this issue.

One group of scholars argues in favour of the H0-hypothesis that there is no necessary and significant relationship between dualisation (X) and party competition (Y). Within this group there is disagreement on the reason why this is the case. Hay (2007), for example, claims that citizens –in particular young outsiders- are increasingly hard to mobilize because they lack trust in politicians and politics in general. Norris (2001) argues that winning and losing are not tied to the socio economic position of voters but to the support of parties being in or out of office. ‘Winners’ supporting the parties in office express greater satisfaction with democracy than ‘losers’ supporting parties which are consistently excluded from power.

Another group of scholars defends the H1-hypothesis that the process of dualisation will affect party competition and may even lead to cleavage change because the growing group of outsiders will support anti-establishment parties (Kriesi et al. 2008, Häusermann et al. 2013). The erosion of traditional cleavages such as class and religion and the rise of ‘new divides’, dualisation and insider-outsider conflicts may fundamentally change the competitive relations between political parties and the political cleavages in Europe.

This paper explores the degree to which economic dualisation has affected inter-party relationships. It will be argued that, although an insider-outsider divide does exist, it has had a moderate effect on party competition. The reasons are that the group of outsiders is smaller than is often assumed and this group is hard to mobilise due to non-voting behaviour and indistinct policy preferences.

2. Theories and hypotheses

Kriesi et al. 2008 argue that the national political space is being restructured as a result of the emergence of a new cleavage linked to denationalization or globalization - the 'integration- demarcation' cleavage.

The structural roots of this new cleavage are linked to processes of increasing economic, cultural and political competition resulting from the opening up of the national borders. The rising levels of these various forms of competition create new groups of 'globalization losers' and 'globalization winners'. While the losers try to protect themselves and their traditional privileges by defending the maintenance of the borders, the winners attempt to take advantage of the new opportunities resulting from the opening up of the national borders. Both the groups of losers and winners constitute new political potentials that are waiting out there to be mobilized by political actors. However, how logical this may sound, the mobilization of these groups is not easy, because there are different ways to lose out in these competitive processes. Because the losers' cultural anxieties provide the most promising common denominator for their mobilization, the new parties of the populist right were most likely to gain from the mobilization of the losers, since they were the ones who appealed most convincingly to their cultural anxieties. Parties from the left, who appealed to the losers mainly in economic terms are less likely to successfully mobilize the potential of the losers. The mobilization of these new potentials may lead to a profound transformation of the national political space in West European countries.

In a follow-up study Kriesi (2009) used an extended data base that allows to systematically distinguish between the 1990s and the 2000s. By analyzing the issue-specific statements of the party actors in six Western European countries by decades using multi-dimensional scaling techniques (MDS) it is possible identify the long-term trends in the structural configurations of the national political space.

The new political potentials are mobilized not only by new challengers in the party system, but also, depending on the national political context, by transformed parties of the established conservative right suggests that change their character and increasingly diverge from other established parties in the system. This development alters the composition of party groups in the party system. Kriesi distinguishes between four party camps - the radical left, the moderate left, the moderate right, and the conservative/new populist right. The Christian-democrats are expected to be part of the moderate or 'old' conservative right, or even on the moderate left. The MDS analysis shows that the two-dimensional solutions fit the data rather better than one-dimensional solutions. In each decade, the horizontal dimension refers to the economic opposition between the defense of the welfare state and the promotion of economic liberalism, while the vertical dimension is defined in cultural terms. On this second dimension, the opposition between cultural liberalism and traditional values (operationalized by a strong defense), is amended by the contrast between a pro-European integration position (which is closely related to cultural liberalism) and an anti-immigration position (which is closely related to the promotion of a strong defense ('army')) in the 1990s and 2000s. This operationalisation reflects the reinterpretation of the cultural dimension in terms of the new cleavage between globalization losers and winners.

Both dimensions are not independent of each other since cultural liberalism/European integration tends to go together with the defense of the welfare state, while cultural traditionalism/opposition to immigration tend to go together with economic liberalism. However, the composition of the moderate and the conservative/populist right changed considerably since a new conservative camp constituted itself, composed of the new challengers of the populist right. In addition, the positioning of the conservative/populist right changed from the 1990s to the 2000s. By the 2000s, some members of this camp (e.g. the Austrian FPÖ/BZÖ and ListMartin, as well as the Swiss radical right) had shifted more to the left on the economic axes where a large part of the potential of globalization losers is located (Lachat and Dolezal 2008), but where no political supply existed in the past.

One of the main results of Kriesi (2009) is that the transformation of the party systems introduced by the new conflicts linked to globalization is moderate. But it does show the rise of a new cleavage indicated by the decreasing salience of economic issues and the increasing salience of cultural issues, in particular of immigration and European integration. All highly polarizing issues are either linked to the opening up of national borders or to the 'cultural turn'. Thus, there is less stability than expected, and not all trends consistently point in the expected direction. The parties on the right are still manoeuvring to find their position in the transformed space. While culturally tied to the defense of the anxieties of the new political potentials of the globalization losers, some parties of the conservative/populist right (especially in Austria) now seem to be moving towards the 'structural hole' at the bottom left of the political space, which combines economic with cultural protectionism. According to Kriesi (2009) they do so by taking an ambiguous position in economic terms, which tries to cater to the fears of the globalization losers by supporting their protection by the welfare state without, however, abandoning economic liberalism and budgetary rigour.

Whereas Kriesi et al. (2008) adhere to the concept of party families, this is abandoned by Häusermann et al. (2013) who argue that we cannot deduce party policy preferences from its party family but instead have to be related to who parties represent (i.e. insiders or outsiders), to the context and dynamics of party competition (i.e. parties as strategic actors that are loosely related to social structures) and party-voter linkages that are particularistic instead of programmatic (i.e. fragmented policies that are targeted towards specific groups of voters that are central for gaining or retaining power).

A similar idea has been defended recently by De Vries and Marks (2012) who argue that, since there is not one single cleavage that dominates party competition everywhere, we need to take into account dimensional complexity: how groups of voters and parties position themselves on the main conflict dimensions. De Vries and Marks (2012) have distinguished four types of research on dimensional complexity depending on the methodological (inductive vs. deductive) and theoretical approaches (sociological vs. strategic). By focusing on the interaction between the three levels (countries, parties and voters) both elements (sociological and strategic) are perceived as equally important and integrated onto a single design. The countries and voters mainly represent the sociological dimension since they differ in terms of the type and degree of socio-economic inequalities. The parties (being issue entrepreneurs) represent the strategic dimension because they may be more or less successful in the agenda-setting of (new) issues that shape party competition and subsequently affect their electoral fortunes during elections.

Most authors that study the insider-outsider divide agree that this development might split the electorate into winners that are satisfied and losers that are dissatisfied. However logical this assumption may sound, it is also contested. There is also a group of authors that questions whether this division will actually have a large impact on political cleavages. According to Hay (2007) electorates discern in contemporary politics an increase in the prevalence of instrumental, self-interested behaviour on the part of those vested with political power. This idea is fuelled by public choice theory's cynicism towards politics which is expressed by the claim that it is irrational to trust politicians and public servants to act in the collective interest. Consequently, the extent to which such assumptions are believed is likely to be an index of the rational disengagement of the electorate from the political process. In a similar vein, neo-liberalism, informed by public choice theoretical assumptions, suggests the value of a tightly delimited political sphere which does not encroach upon the essentially private realms of economic and social exchange, encouraging a profoundly suspicious, sceptical and anti-political culture. This may lead to a vicious circle that makes the provision of public goods increasingly different because less trust leads to more restrictions on politics and hence less collective goods which again leads to less trust, and so on.

In Hay's perception the most marginalized from society (i.e. the outsiders) are also the least likely to participate in formal politics. In addition, voter cynicism grows most rapidly amongst sections of the population previously characterized by the highest levels of political engagement, party identification and participation: the young, well-educated and affluent 'critical citizens'. The end result of this process is that both insiders and outsiders abstain from politics. This process is not demand-driven by supply-driven: neo-liberalisation and globalisation weaken the capacity for deliberation, decision making and human agency in so far that they promote a shift from state to market. This shift implies removal of those welfare benefits which act as disincentives to market participation (subordination of social justice to perceived economic imperatives). It is a defense of labour market flexibility and cost competitiveness that replaces a trust in democratic decision-making into a confidence in the efficiency of market and quasi-market mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Since the state is not expected anymore to safeguard the interests and well-being of citizens, depolitisation becomes dominant over politicization and consequently leads to a decrease in participation. Rationality is the result of this system change from state intervention to state restrictiveness that results from the rise of neo-liberalism and public choice theory. Rational people hate politics, but in doing so they undermine their collective welfare because the neo-liberal paradigm is 'workfare' oriented (especially in times of austerity). Hence, whereas the outsiders are most in need of social protection, they are the least apt to get politically involved by supporting parties that strive for such a social security.

Norris (2011), by contrast, argues that rationality is the individual critical citizen's response to performance. If politicians or governments are usually demonstrably corrupt, inept, or self-serving, or perceived to be so, then rational citizens should conclude that they have become untrustworthy. In addition, institutional factors play a role since satisfaction with democracy is conditioned by the constitutional arrangements in any state, especially by power-sharing arrangements.

Satisfaction with democracy should be greater at micro-level among electoral winners than losers, as well as being maximized at macro-level in countries with power-sharing regimes which expand the number of electoral 'winners'. According to Norris public support for the political system has not eroded since support for democracy can coincide with scepticism on how democracy works. Political disillusionment arises from growing public expectations, negative news, and failing government performance which is judged through a partisan prism, where 'winners' supporting the parties in office express greater satisfaction with democracy than 'losers' supporting parties which are consistently excluded from power.

Although both views have contradictory interpretations of the causes and effects of the democratic deficit they implicitly agree that it is unlikely that dualisation fundamentally changes party competition. In Hay's view the reason is that distrust in politicians is more or less equal for both insiders and outsiders. In Norris' view dualisation has only an impact as far as this dichotomy coincides with differences in access to the internet and different levels of education, that is the available assets to express the dissatisfaction with government performance.

3. Conceptualisation, operationalisation and design

The research design seeks to identify the party-voter linkages across Europe by linking survey data to manifesto data. In order to address the impact of dualisation on political cleavages in the 'New' Europe the conceptualization and operationalisation of the (in)dependent variables need to be clarified. There is no consensus in the literature on the identification of insiders and outsiders. Compared to neoclassical economists, who confine outsiders to those that are unemployed, the segmentation theorists use a wider definition of outsiders as workers in the secondary labour market. This conceptualisation of insiders and outsiders is based on the dual labour market theory that distinguishes between the "primary" (or internal) market with high employment stability and a "secondary" (or external) labour markets with high job instability, low wages, poorer working conditions etc. (Davidsson & Naczyk, 2009: 7). This has become the dominant way to operationalise the insider-outsider divide.

The data on the insider-outsider divide has been extracted from the European Social Survey (ESS) (i.e. the cumulative file of all rounds in the years 2002-2010) that offers detailed information on the social characteristics of citizens in 27 (mostly European) countries.¹ Since the analysis is restricted to Europe, Israel and Russia are excluded from the analysis. The operationalisation of insiders and outsiders and the distribution per country is specified in Appendix A and C.

Insiders are defined as those that are employed full-time with a permanent job or as those with part-time or fixed-term jobs who do not want a full-time or permanent job. Outsiders are then defined as those who are unemployed, employed fulltime in fixed-term and temporary jobs (unless they do not want a permanent job), employed part time (unless they do not want a full-time job) (Rueda 2005: 63)ⁱⁱ. Since a dichotomy of insiders and outsiders is rather crude (as this distinction is a matter of degree (Lindbeck and Snower 2001: 165)), a trichotomy is better able to categorize the main differences. For this reason a third category has been introduced of so-called semi-insiders that work mostly part-time (on average less hours than insiders but more hours than outsiders). This in-between group includes many females, is well-educated and is relatively large in Scandinavia. The insiders are dominated by older males, the semi-insiders by females and the outsiders by young people. The group of outsiders is on average as large as that of the semi-insiders but the country differences are quite large, as is shown in Appendix C.

Although it is not uncommon to use a tripartite division to characterise the segmentation of the labour market, there is little agreement in the literature on the number and definition of labour market segments (Davidsson & Naczyk, 2009: 21, Häusermann & Schwander 2009: 14). Recently, alternatives are explored, such as the post-industrial class schemes that are based on the classification of occupations and constructed along the dimensions of skills and type of work. Häusermann & Schwander (2009) argue that this classification would give a more adequate picture of the insider-outsider divide and its social and political consequences because it recognizes that sector, age and gender are important variables in the analysis of dualisation. Since this differentiation cannot be grasped by using a dichotomy, we have opted for a trichotomy as discussed before in order to do some justice to the importance of these variables. Appendix B shows the top ten of occupations per group. Interestingly, the same professions rank at the top of all three groups, namely "5220 Shop, stall, market salespers, demonstrators" and "9132 Helper, cleaner in office, hotel", but the relative share is lowest in the insider group, in-between in the semi-insiders group and highest in the outsider group.

This means that there is a structured variation within professional groups on the degree of being insider or outsider. The typical “service proletariat”, such as “5123 Waiters, waitresses and bartenders”, is mainly part of the outsider group.

The ESS Survey has been matched with the party manifestos dataset that offers data on party policy positions during elections.ⁱⁱⁱ The manifesto data have been matched by means of the party code available in the ESS for the variable “Party voted for in last national election”. Although these manifestos data have been heavily criticised in the past 15 years, they are most suited to combine with data on voters because these manifestos are issued during elections so that voters are (often through the media) informed about the party policy positions that are reflected in these documents. They are not informed by the positioning of parties by experts which is an alternative source of data that might be more apt to use is one is interested in the full range of contrasting positions. Since voters do not read manifestos but mainly get information on party positions through the media, data on major daily newspapers would be even better than using manifestos, but unfortunately it is not feasible to analyze these articles in all European countries (Kriesi et al. 2008). For this reason, the data on manifestos are the best available data to use if one wants to analyse the impact of dualisation in the whole of Europe. These party positions can be used in order to position parties on the left-right scale and the progressive-conservative scale. This enables us to compare parties and voters on both dimensions in order to examine to which degree insiders and outsiders are ideologically close to the parties that they do vote for. The larger this mismatch is, the better the chances for new parties to mobilise dissatisfied voters.

Since families of nations differ strongly in terms of labour market segmentation, the impact of inequality on political cleavages is also differentiated by the national context. It is quite common to distinguish between Scandinavia, Continental or Western Europe, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe. These nations are families because they share a common history of welfare statism and degrees of dualisation (Hemerijck 2012). For example in Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries dualist trends are more pronounced than in Scandinavian countries (Palier and Thelen 2010: 121). Within the wider context of the new Europe we also have to distinguish between the affluent and established democracies on the one hand and the new democracies at the other hand. The latter have a labour market that is less segmented and less post-industrial and hence characterised by a different insider-outsider ratio than the former. In addition, within a group of countries the type and degree of segmentation, state intervention and interest intermediation may differ, as those between Germany and France (Palier and Thelen 2010).

The families of parties approach focuses on how party groups relate to insiders and outsiders. We use the rather fine grained classification of party families in the party manifestos dataset and relate that to our trichotomy.^{iv} One well-known proposition in this respect comes from Rueda (2005) who argues that social democracy is most apt to protect the interests of the insiders over those of outsiders. This is expected the same in all institutional contexts, irrespective the interest intermediation structure. However, Palier and Thelen (2010: 121) have argued that dualist trends are weakest where social democratic parties are strongest, namely in Scandinavian countries. This contradiction suggests that the position of social democracy may differ per family of nation and hence underlines the need to analyse the interaction (linkages) between these levels. This argument has been extended to all party families by Häusermann et al. (2013) who claim that there is no structural linkage anymore between party groups and social segments in society.

Others have emphasized the competitive relations between party groups. Established party families (liberal, conservative, christian and social democracy) are often situated in the centre of the political space whereas wing parties (New Left and new populist right) are more situated towards the extremes (Keman and Pennings 2006). These positions affect the number of potential voters that a party is able to attract and the degree of electoral support of insiders and outsiders is highly relevant for the structure of political cleavages. If one particular party traditionally dominates party competition this has consequences for the strategies, size and success of all parties. If this pivot party loses its central position due to a decline in electoral support the other parties chances to gain electoral support get better. In addition, and related to this aspect is the type of electoral system since some systems are more open to change and allow new parties to challenge established parties more than other systems.

We distinguish between parties in government and opposition parties and between established and new parties. The electoral studies approach focuses on how the socio-economic status of voters matters for their support of parties. Insiders are expected to support established parties and to shift to the centre-left whereas outsiders are expected to support wing parties and shift to the populist right.

Every instance of voter support for a party always implies that three levels interact: groups of voters (e.g. insiders vs. outsiders) support a party that belongs to a family (e.g. centre vs. wing) that is situated in a country that also belongs to a group with a common history (e.g. affluent and established democracies vs. upcoming and new democracies). The intersection of these group memberships induces the diversity and dynamics of political cleavages in the new Europe. For this reason the analysis focuses on the main characteristics of insiders and outsiders per region, the support of these groups for new and opposition parties and per party group (per country) and the party-voter distances on the main conflict dimensions (per country).

4. Results

The data analysis examines the main characteristics of insiders and outsiders in relation to voters, parties and countries. Table 1 gives an overview of the main characteristics of insiders and outsiders. The insiders are more often males and the semi-insiders female due to the higher share of part-time work. Outsiders are much younger than insiders which indicates that their marginal position may change over time. Insiders have a similar level of education as outsiders, but the in-between group has on average one more year of education.

As expected, outsiders experience more job insecurity than insiders. Remarkably, the semi-insiders feel more secure than the true insiders. The table shows a similar pattern regarding the degree of control over work, income and union membership: the outsiders are characterized by the lowest level, the semi-insiders by the highest level and the insiders are in-between. This pattern confirms the findings of Häusermann and Schwander (2009) that the insider-outsider divide is clearly gendered, but also indicates that typical (part-time) employment of women does not always equal a marginal position.

Table 2 shows that there are significant differences between the regions in the degree to which insider and outsiders have control over their work. The highest degree is in Scandinavia and the lowest degree in the East. Outsiders have always less control than insiders, but outsiders in Scandinavia have nearly the same control as insiders in the West and the same differences apply to the West compared to the South. Hence, the outsiders in the North and West are better off (or at least not worse off) than the insiders in the South and the East.

Table 1. Main characteristics of insiders and outsiders

| | insider | semi insider | outsider | N |
|------------------------------------|---------|--------------|----------|--------|
| Females (%) | 48 | 62 | 54 | 79694 |
| Age (Mean) | 50 | 47 | 38 | 150270 |
| Education years (Mean) | 12 | 13 | 12 | 149775 |
| Subjective job security (%) (West) | 68 | 71 | 44 | 32469 |
| Control over work (%) | 66 | 77 | 54 | 79277 |
| Income sufficient (%) | 75 | 86 | 61 | 111423 |
| Union membership (%) | 55 | 57 | 33 | 75429 |

Table 2 Control over work and feeling about income (between brackets) by region (%)

| | insider | semi insider | outsider | N |
|-------------|---------|--------------|----------|--------------|
| Scandinavia | 88 (94) | 87 (92) | 74 (83) | 18633 (6916) |
| West | 75 (91) | 77 (91) | 60 (80) | 31130 (8515) |
| South | 60 (79) | 69 (79) | 48 (46) | 8061 (3528) |
| East | 54 (45) | 60 (45) | 42 (46) | 21456 (8936) |

Reading example: 54% of the insiders in the East have some control over work and 45% of them feels that the income is sufficient.

The tables also list (between brackets) the subjective feeling about the level of income. In this case the three groups do not differ a lot in Scandinavia and the West: the outsiders are nearly as satisfied as the insiders. The outsiders in the South and East are much more dissatisfied. Most remarkable is that all groups in the East are equally dissatisfied: only 45% is satisfied with the level of income. Given this general pattern one can conclude that the effects of segmentation on the control of work and the (perception of) level of income strongly depend on the region and hence on the type of welfare state, the structure of the labour market and the phase of post-industrialisation.

We can examine this further by differentiating between ratio between insiders and outsiders differs per region. Earlier research has shown that dualisation is strongest in continental Europe where passive labour market policies prevail and lowest in liberal countries.




Fig 1. Insiders and Outsiders per region




Fig 2. Insiders and Outsiders per Party family

Figure 1 shows that indeed Scandinavia and Western Europe are most dualised in the sense that the labour market is dominated by the classical insiders anymore since they are smaller in size when we take the groups of semi-insiders and outsiders together. Southern Europe and especially Eastern Europe are far less dualised because the insiders still dominate the labour market. A specification per country is given in Appendix C.

In order to assess the possible impact on political cleavages, Figure 2 gives an overview of the electoral support by the three groups to party groups. The pattern shows a U-curve in case of outsiders, an inverted U-curve in case of insiders and hardly an curve in case of semi-insiders. This means that, in line with most other findings in the literature, insiders are most inclined to support established parties and outsiders to support wing parties. The social democrats do not get relative more electoral support from insiders than most other party groups which seems to contradict the findings of Rueda (2005). This pattern indicates that the insider-outsider divide is relevant for the political cleavage because if outsiders would vote massively they would support wing parties which would go at the cost of established parties. This underlines the importance of the degree of mobilisation and participation for the impact of dualisation: if outsiders are hard to mobilise, the effects of dualisation on political cleavages will be moderate.

Table 3 presents some details on the mobilisation and participation of the three labour market segments. Outsiders clearly vote less than (semi)insiders which is a serious problem for those parties that want to mobilise them. Outsiders are also less interested in politics. Interestingly, their trust in politicians is very low, but not lower than those of insiders. Also semi-insiders have quite a low level of trust.

This confirms the thesis by Norris that most voters are “equal” in this respect and one cannot predict political trust from the socio economic position of citizens. The level of participation of insiders and outsiders, as indicated by contacting politicians, taking part in demonstrations and in boycotts, is also roughly the same. Also the degree of satisfaction with the economy, the government and with democracy are comparable between insiders and outsiders. Semi-insiders are most satisfied in these respects, which is in line with results presented in the previous tables.

| | insider | semi insider | outsider | N |
|---------------------------------------|---------|--------------|----------|--------|
| Voted (% yes) | 78 | 82 | 63 | 112598 |
| Interested in politics (%) | 48 | 50 | 40 | 150483 |
| Trust in Politicians | 19 | 28 | 19 | 148316 |
| Contacted politician last year | 14 | 17 | 13 | 150425 |
| Taken part in demonstration last year | 6 | 8 | 8 | 150394 |
| Boycotted products last year | 14 | 21 | 15 | 150024 |
| Satisfied with state of economy | 34 | 46 | 30 | 147995 |
| Satisfied with national government | 30 | 37 | 27 | 145245 |
| Satisfied with democracy | 44 | 56 | 42 | 145695 |

Table 3 shows an interesting pattern, namely that in most instances the main contrast is not between insiders and outsiders but between semi-insiders on the one hand and insiders/outsideers on the other hand. Although insiders are more interested in politics than outsiders they equally trust politicians, contact politicians, boycott products, are satisfied by the economy and with democracy. The semi-insiders, on the other hand, have most trust, are most politically active and most satisfied with the economy, the government and democracy in general. These results are confirmed by Gallego (2007-8) who on the basis of the European Social Survey data showed that the labour market position (i.e. working status) is a relatively weak predictor of political participation compared to education and social class (Davidsson and Naczyk 2009: 17). It correlates with decreasing electoral turnout, but not with different forms of political participation.

| | insider | semi insider | outsider | N |
|---|---------|--------------|----------|-------|
| Non-voters | 22 | 18 | 37 | 36913 |
| Voting for new left/liberal parties (West) | 7 | 8 | 10 | 4812 |
| Voting for new radical right parties (West) | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3033 |
| Voting for opposition parties | 53 | 50 | 68 | 57165 |

Reading example: 5% of the insiders voted for radical right parties.
 Note: the definition of new parties is based on H Keman, A Krouwel (2006)

Table 4 shows the degree to which the three groups vote and if they do so for which type of party: new left, new right or opposition parties. The table shows that outsiders are most inclined not to vote at all. If they do vote, their support for new left parties is stronger than their support for their radical right parties. This contradicts the findings of Kriesi et al. (2008) who found that globalisation losers were most likely to support radical right parties.

It does support the findings of Häusermann and Schwander (2009) who report that outsiders are most likely to support left parties due to their marginalised position. The table also shows that outsiders do vote more for opposition parties than insiders do. This means that dualisation will strengthen the power position of opposition parties to the extent that outsiders are actually willing to vote.

The results also give some support to the reasoning of Colin Hay that non-participation will dampen the degree of cleavage change that results from dualisation. Indeed, dramatic realignment along new cleavages does not seem to have taken place in recent years (Caramani 2011: 243). The outsiders form a potential that still is to be mobilized and this process is slow because many outsiders do not vote.

Since the previous table is confined to Western Europe, we expand the analysis to all countries by differentiating between the electoral support per party group per country (Table 5). Green parties attract a significant number of outsiders but they are mainly Western European phenomena and are quite marginal in Southern and Eastern Europe. Socialist parties are present in all parts of Europe and they manage to attract outsiders especially when there are no green parties. In most cases social democratic parties score lower than socialist parties, but there are a number of exceptions, such as in Estonia. Also, in case there is no socialist party, the social democrats have a relatively high support of outsiders, such as in Ireland and Cyprus. The four established party groups (social democrats, liberals, christian democrats and conservatives) do have similar shares of outsiders. In those cases that one of them has a relatively high score this often implies that one of the other groups is not represented in the party system or it is very small in size. The three party groups at the radical right wing are often not represented and do mostly not perform much better than the other party groups. From these three groups the ethnic-regional/special interest group performs relatively well, especially when there is not much competition at the right wing (Spain, Ireland) or at the left wing (Turkey). We can conclude that typical outsider-parties that mainly attract voters from the group of outsiders (> 50%) do hardly exist in the period 2002-2010. The share of outsiders does not differ significantly per party group. Only if there is no competition from either the left wing or the right wing this may be in favour of a particular group that is well represented in the party system.

Table 5 supports the finding of Kriesi (2009) that issues most closely linked to denationalization have not come to dominate party competition. Although the salience of immigration and European integration have greatly increased, this increase started from a very low level and the overall structure of the agendas of national election campaigns continues to be dominated by welfare state issues, and issues related to economic and cultural liberalism. The mobilization linked to the new cultural cleavage has not been able to outweigh the decline of the mobilization linked to the old cleavages. Only in particular party systems, such as Switzerland, has the mobilization of the globalization losers increased the level of polarization in the party system. According to Kriesi (2009), in the remaining Western European countries, the polarization level has remained low in spite of the enhanced salience of the issues linked to the new cleavage. The success of the new radical right challengers is limited compared to the (temporary) success of the earlier challengers on the left (the Greens and the new social movements).

Table 5. The share of outsiders per party group in Europe, 2002-2010

| | Country | eco | com | soc | lib | chr | con | Nat | agr | eth/sip | Mean |
|----|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|------|
| 11 | SE Sweden | 32 | 27 | 16 | 15 | 17 | 14 | 23 | 15 | - | 17 |
| 12 | NO Norway | - | 17 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 10 | - | 14 | 16 | 12 |
| 13 | DK Denmark | - | 19 | 14 | 13 | 21 | 12 | 14 | - | 17 | 14 |
| 14 | FI Finland | 32 | 24 | 16 | 33 | 221 | 15 | - | 20 | 17 | 19 |
| 21 | BE Belgium | 24 | - | 21 | 13 | 12 | - | - | 12 | 15 | 16 |
| 22 | NL Netherlands | 22 | 20 | 16 | 14 | 12 | - | 22 | - | 20 | 16 |
| 23 | LU Luxembourg | 12 | - | 12 | 10 | 9 | - | - | - | 2 | 10 |
| 31 | FR France | 22 | 16 | 16 | - | - | 12 | 14 | - | - | 15 |
| 32 | IT Italy | 24 | 25 | , 24 | 13 | 23 | 17 | - | 9 | 23 | 23 |
| 33 | ES Spain | - | 42 | 34 | - | - | 27 | - | - | 30 | 32 |
| 34 | GR Greece | - | 27 | 32 | - | 34 | - | - | - | - | 33 |
| 35 | PT Portugal | - | 26 | 20 | - | - | - | - | - | 28 | 21 |
| 41 | DE Germany | 20 | 24 | 14 | 18 | 14 | - | - | - | - | 16 |
| 42 | AT Austria | 23 | 20 | 10 | 13 | 11 | - | 17 | - | - | 13 |
| 43 | CH Switzerland | 14 | 19 | 8 | 8 | 11 | - | 9 | 7 | 0 | 9 |
| 51 | GB United Kingdom | 22 | 25 | 15 | 16 | - | 13 | - | - | 18 | 15 |
| 53 | IE Ireland | 31 | - | 28 | 16 | 28 | 23 | - | - | 46 | 26 |
| 55 | CY Cyprus | 32 | 27 | 16 | 15 | 17 | 14 | 23 | 15 | - | 17 |
| 80 | TR Turkey | - | 17 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 10 | - | 14 | 16 | 12 |
| 82 | BG Bulgaria | - | 19 | 14 | 13 | 21 | 12 | 14 | - | 17 | 14 |
| 83 | HR Croatia | 32 | 24 | 16 | 33 | 22 | 15 | - | 20 | 17 | 19 |
| 86 | CZ Czech Republic | 24 | - | 21 | 13 | 12 | - | - | 12 | 15 | 16 |
| 92 | EE Estonia | 22 | 20 | 16 | 14 | 12 | - | 22 | - | 20 | 16 |
| 96 | HU Hungary | 12 | - | 12 | 10 | 9 | - | - | - | 2 | 10 |
| 97 | PL Poland | 22 | 16 | 16 | - | - | 12 | 14 | - | - | 15 |
| 98 | SK Slovakia | 24 | 25 | - | 24 | 13 | 23 | 17 | - | 9 | 23 |
| | Mean | 23,2 | 22,2 | 17,8 | 17,4 | 16,9 | 16,6 | 21,9 | 15,7 | 20,5 | 17,0 |

Reading example: 32% of the voters of the Swedish Greens are outsiders. This means that 68% is (semi-)insider since the sum of insider and outsider support is always 100%.

One last aspect should be explored, namely the extent to which parties offer policy positions that actually correspond with the preferences of voters. By comparing parties and voters on the main conflict dimensions we can establish to which degree insiders and outsiders are ideologically close to the parties that they vote for. The closer this match is, the smaller the chance for new and challenging parties to mobilise dissatisfied voters.

In order to make this comparison, we operationalise the two main political cleavages that shape party competition: left vs. right and progressive vs. conservative (the operationalisation is derived from Camia and Caramani, 2011). While the former dimension incorporates issues related to material welfare, the latter focuses on immaterial matters, such as the quality of life in general, and offer a response to new challenges by stressing the (national or regional) identity and traditions, such as questions of social values, a shared language and history, requiring adaptation and acceptance by immigrants. The construction of the two dimensions is explained in Appendix D. Both scales range from 0 to 10. The distance is computed as the difference between the voter position minus the party position. A high score means that the voter is positioned more to the right or the conservative side than party.




Fig. 3 Parties and Voters on the Left-Right Scale




Fig. 4 Parties and Voters on the Progressive-Conservative Scale

Figures 3 and 4 show the position of the parties and voters on the two main conflict dimensions aggregated per country. On average, parties offer positions that are more conservative and more left than voters.

In order to examine whether this is the same for insiders and outsiders per country the data are aggregated to the country level (Table 6). The table shows remarkably stable patterns of the party-voter distances on the main conflict dimensions in Europe. First, in case of insiders, semi-insiders and outsiders the distance between voters and parties is highly similar per country. Whereas these groups are positioned mostly to the right of parties (a mean of 2 on the on the left-right scale) they are somewhat less conservative than parties (a mean of -1 on the on the progressive-conservative scale). In most cases these differences are the same per country as the three groups hardly differ from each other. This means that, in the group of voters, outsiders are not at a larger distance from parties than insider and semi-insiders.

Table 6. Party-voter distances on the main conflict dimensions in Europe, 2002-2010 (means)

| | Country | Party-voter distances on left-right dimension | | | | Party-voter distances on Progressive-conservative dimension | | | |
|----|-------------------|---|--------------|-----------|-------|---|--------------|-----------|-------|
| | | Insiders | Semi-insider | outsiders | n | Insiders | Semi-insider | outsiders | n |
| 11 | SE Sweden | 2 | 2 | 2 | 987 | -1 | -1 | 0 | 964 |
| 12 | NO Norway | 3 | 3 | 2 | 618 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 613 |
| 13 | DK Denmark | 3 | 3 | 3 | 667 | -3 | -3 | -2 | 654 |
| 14 | FI Finland | 3 | 4 | 3 | 974 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 970 |
| 21 | BE Belgium | 3 | 3 | 3 | 489 | -1 | -1 | 0 | 508 |
| 22 | NL Netherlands | 1 | 1 | 1 | 896 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 896 |
| 23 | LU Luxembourg | 3 | 3 | 2 | 80 | -1 | -1 | 0 | 81 |
| 31 | FR France | 3 | 2 | 2 | 318 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 322 |
| 32 | IT Italy | -1 | -1 | -1 | 174 | -2 | -2 | -1 | 177 |
| 33 | ES Spain | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1041 | -1 | -1 | 0 | 1035 |
| 34 | GR Greece | 4 | 3 | 4 | 560 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 582 |
| 35 | PT Portugal | 0 | 1 | 1 | 557 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 531 |
| 41 | DE Germany | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1134 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1107 |
| 42 | AT Austria | 2 | 2 | 2 | 311 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 311 |
| 43 | CH Switzerland | 0 | 1 | 1 | 208 | -2 | -1 | -1 | 209 |
| 51 | GB United Kingdom | 1 | 1 | 1 | 627 | -2 | -3 | -3 | 656 |
| 53 | IE Ireland | 3 | 3 | 3 | 765 | 0 | -1 | 0 | 821 |
| 55 | CY Cyprus | 2 | 2 | 2 | 216 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 216 |
| 80 | TR Turkey | 0 | 0 | 0 | 574 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 493 |
| 82 | BG Bulgaria | 1 | 1 | 1 | 451 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 430 |
| 83 | HR Croatia | 3 | 2 | 3 | 275 | -2 | -2 | -2 | 272 |
| 86 | CZ Czech Republic | 3 | 3 | 4 | 388 | 0 | -1 | 0 | 362 |
| 92 | EE Estonia | 2 | 2 | 2 | 882 | -3 | -4 | -3 | 855 |
| 96 | HU Hungary | 1 | 1 | 1 | 521 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 499 |
| 97 | PL Poland | 2 | 1 | 2 | 464 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 515 |
| 98 | SK Slovakia | 2 | 3 | 3 | 259 | -2 | -3 | -2 | 309 |
| | Mean | 2 | 2 | 2 | 14437 | -1 | -1 | -1 | 14386 |

5. Conclusions

It has been argued that the effects of dualisation on cleavages depend on the interaction of three levels (voters, parties and countries) that can be analysed by means of party-voter linkages. It has been shown that the insider-outsider divide has had a moderate effect on party competition. The main reasons are that the group of outsiders is smaller than is often assumed (how much smaller differs per region) and that this group is hard to mobilise due to non-voting and indistinct policy preferences.

Dualisation has been defined on the basis of the (non)participation on the labour market. Instead of a dichotomy a trichotomy has been used of insiders, semi-insiders and outsiders. The three groups clearly differ in terms of gender, age, education, job security, control over work, income and union membership. Although the semi-insiders' participation is somewhat lower than that of typical insiders, their social and political position is less better. The existence of this in-between group means that the relative size of the group of outsiders is smaller than is often assumed.

In addition, the social position of these groups clearly differs per region. The outsiders in Scandinavia are far better off than the insiders in the South and the East. This means that the type of welfare state, the structure of the labour market and the phase of post-industrialisation has a strong impact on the type and degree of dualisation and its effects on the socio economic position of insiders and outsiders.

In case of political trust, participation and satisfaction with government and democracy, the main contrast is not between insiders and outsiders but between semi-insiders on the one hand and insiders/outsideers on the other hand. Although outsiders do have a number of characteristics that make them potentially more inclined to support new challenging parties, the degree of the actual support does not differ significantly from insiders. Although outsiders do vote more for opposition parties than insiders, typical outsider-parties do hardly exist in the period 2002-2010. The share of outsiders does not differ significantly per party group. Only if there is no competition from either the left wing or the right wing this may be in favour of a particular party group. The inclination of outsiders for non-voting makes them relatively hard to mobilise.

The distance between voters and parties on the two main conflict dimensions is highly similar per country. Whereas both insiders and outsiders are positioned mostly to the right of parties, they are somewhat less conservative than parties. In the group of voters, outsiders are not at a larger distance from parties than insiders and semi-insiders. This rather close match between policy positions makes outsiders (again) hard to mobilise.

When we relate these findings to the ongoing academic debate on the effects of dualisation on inter-party relationships, we do find support for the group of scholars that states that there is no necessary and significant relationship between dualisation and party competition. The reasons are twofold. First, young outsiders are increasingly hard to mobilize due to lack of political trust and therefore abstain from voting. Second, it is not the socio economic position of voters that matters a lot for their party preference. Instead, the support of parties being in or out of office is more relevant. As this may change from election to election there is not one party or group of parties that will solely profit from the discontent of outsiders.

References

- Camia, V. and D. Caramani (2011). Family Meetings: Ideological Convergence Within Party Families Across Europe, 1945–2009. *Comparative European Politics* 10(1): 48–85.
- Caramani, D. (2011) Party Systems, in: D. Caramani, *Comparative Politics*, Oxford, pp. 237-258.
- Davidsson, J. & M. Naczyk (2009) The Ins and Outs of Dualisation: A Literature review. Working papers of the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe, REC-WP 02/2009.
- De Vries, C.E., G. Marks (2012) The struggle over dimensionality: A note of theory and empirics. *European Union Politics* 13 (2), 185-103.
- Gallego, A. (2007-8) Unequal Political participation in Europe. *International Journal of Sociology* 37 (4), 10-25.
- Häusermann, S. Picot, G. and Geering, D. (2013) Rethinking Party Politics and the Welfare State - Recent Advances in the Literature. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43 (1), 221-240.
- Häusermann, S., Schwander, H. (2009) Identifying outsiders across countries: similarities and differences in the patterns of dualisation. Working papers of the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe, REC-WP 09/2009.
- Hay, C. (2007) *Why we hate politics*, London: Polity.
- Hemerijck, A. (2012) *Changing Welfare States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keman, H., Krouwel, A. (2006) The Rise of a New Political Class?: Emerging New Parties and the Populist Challenge in Western Europe. Working Papers Political Science No. 2006/02, Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/The%20Rise%20of%20a%20New%20Political%20Class%20Emerging%20New%20Parties%20and%20the%20populist%20challenge%20in%20Western%20Europe_tcm31-42710.pdf
- Keman, H., Pennings, P. (2006) 'Competition and Coalescence in European Party Systems: Social Democracy and Christian Democracy Moving into the 21st Century', *Sweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 12 (2), 95-126.
- Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., Frey, T. (2008) *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesi, H. (2009) The development of the structure of West European party systems. Mimeo. Originally downloaded at: www.princeton.edu/politics/events/.../Kriesi_CPCplloquium_4-09.pdf
- Kriesi, H. (2010) Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage Based on Values, *West European Politics*, Special Issue: The Structure of Political Competition in Western Europe, 33 (3), 673-685.

- Lachat, R. and Dolezal, M. (2008) Demand side: dealignment and realignment of the structural political potentials', pp. 237-266 in H. Kriesi et al., *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lindbeck, A. and Snower, D.J. (2001) 'Insiders versus Outsiders', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 15, 165–188.
- Norris, P. (2011) *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Palier, B. and Thelen, K. (2010) "Institutionalizing Dualism: Complementarities and Change in France and Germany", *Politics and Society*, 38/1, 119-148.
- Rueda, D. (2005) 'Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies, The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties', *American Political Science Review*, 99, 67–74.

Appendix A. Syntax used for insiders and outsiders using the cumulative ESS data (2002-2010).

* Involuntarily?.

compute toofewhrs= wkhsch - wkhct.

if essround eq 2 or essround eq 5 voluntarily=0.

if toofewhrs lt 4 and toofewhrs ge -4 voluntarily=1.

* wrkctr = CONTRACT; wkhct= hours.

if wrkctr = 1 & wkhct gt 60 insider=1.

if wrkctr = 1 & wkhct le 60 insider=2.

if wrkctr = 1 & wkhct le 38 insider=3.

if wrkctr = 1 & wkhct le 20 insider=4.

if wrkctra = 1 & wkhct gt 60 insider=1.

if wrkctra = 1 & wkhct le 60 insider=2.

if wrkctra = 1 & wkhct le 38 insider=3.

if wrkctra = 1 & wkhct le 20 insider=4.

if wrkctr = 1 & wkhct le 60 & voluntarily=1 insider=1.

if wrkctr = 1 & wkhct le 38 & voluntarily=1 insider=1.

if wrkctr = 1 & wkhct le 20 & voluntarily=1 insider=1.

if wrkctra = 1 & wkhct le 60 & voluntarily=1 insider=1.

if wrkctra = 1 & wkhct le 38 & voluntarily=1 insider=1.

if wrkctra = 1 & wkhct le 20 & voluntarily=1 insider=1.

if wrkctr = 2 & wkhct gt 60 insider=5.

if wrkctr = 2 & wkhct le 60 insider=6.

if wrkctr = 2 & wkhct le 38 insider=7.

if wrkctr = 2 & wkhct le 20 insider=8.

if wrkctra = 2 & wkhct gt 60 insider=5.

if wrkctra = 2 & wkhct le 60 insider=6.

if wrkctra = 2 & wkhct le 38 insider=7.

if wrkctra = 2 & wkhct le 20 insider=8.

* Unempla=unemployed.

if uempla = 1 insider=9.

if uempli = 1 insider=10.

compute insider3=insider.

recode insider3 (1,2=1)(3,4,5=2)(6,7,8,9,10=3).

value lab insider3 1 'insider' 2 'semi insider' 3 'outsider'.

Source: ESS Cumulative File 2002-2010

Appendix B: Insiders and outsiders per profession (the top ten) (column perc.).**Insiders:**

| | |
|---|------|
| 5220 Shop, stall, market salespers, demonstrators | 4,70 |
| 9132 Helper, cleaner in office, hotel, other establ | 2,20 |
| 4190 Other office clerks | 2,00 |
| 9320 Manufacturing labourers | 1,90 |
| 3231 Nursing associate professionals | 1,60 |
| 8324 Heavy truck and lorry drivers | 1,50 |
| 4115 Secretaries | 1,40 |
| 4121 Accounting and bookkeeping clerks | 1,40 |
| 5122 Cooks | 1,40 |
| 3431 Adm secretaries, related associate prof | 1,20 |

Semi-insiders:

| | |
|---|------|
| 5220 Shop, stall, market salespers, demonstrators | 6,00 |
| 2320 Secondary education teaching professionals | 3,60 |
| 9132 Helper, cleaner in office, hotel, other establ | 3,60 |
| 4190 Other office clerks | 2,70 |
| 3231 Nursing associate professionals | 2,60 |
| 2331 Primary education teaching professionals | 2,50 |
| 5132 Institution-based personal care workers | 2,50 |
| 4115 Secretaries | 2,10 |
| 3431 Adm secretaries, related associate prof | 1,60 |
| 5133 Home-based personal care workers | 1,30 |

Outsiders:

| | |
|---|------|
| 5220 Shop, stall, market salespers, demonstrators | 7,60 |
| 9132 Helper, cleaner in office, hotel, other establ | 4,70 |
| 5123 Waiters, waitresses and bartenders | 2,90 |
| 9320 Manufacturing labourers | 2,80 |
| 4190 Other office clerks | 1,90 |
| 5122 Cooks | 1,80 |
| 7122 Bricklayers and stonemasons | 1,50 |
| 9211 Farm-hands and labourers | 1,50 |
| 2320 Secondary education teaching professionals | 1,30 |
| 5131 Child-care workers | 1,30 |

Source: ESS Cumulative File 2002-2010

Appendix C. The distribution of insiders and outsiders

| The distribution of insiders and outsiders per country (ESS, 2002-2010) | | | | |
|---|-------------|------------------|--------------|-----------|
| | Insider (%) | semi insider (%) | Outsider (%) | Total (n) |
| AT Austria | 50.3 | 31.3 | 18.4 | 4697 |
| BE Belgium | 34.4 | 45.8 | 19.7 | 6321 |
| BG Bulgaria | 64.2 | 4.8 | 31.1 | 4678 |
| CH Switzerland | 61.9 | 23.8 | 14.3 | 6916 |
| CY Cyprus | 32.7 | 30.0 | 37.3 | 1060 |
| CZ Czech Republic | 70.0 | 7.6 | 22.3 | 6282 |
| DE Germany | 49.3 | 30.6 | 20.1 | 11108 |
| DK Denmark | 21.4 | 62.5 | 16.1 | 5941 |
| EE Estonia | 73.7 | 9.7 | 16.6 | 5552 |
| ES Spain | 52.2 | 11.6 | 36.2 | 5921 |
| FI Finland | 42.5 | 31.3 | 26.2 | 8160 |
| FR France | 29.7 | 46.2 | 24.1 | 4539 |
| GB United Kingdom | 36.8 | 44.1 | 19.1 | 7713 |
| GR Greece | 52.5 | 11.4 | 36.1 | 3871 |
| HR Croatia | 63.9 | 4.1 | 32.0 | 2200 |
| HU Hungary | 73.0 | 6.3 | 20.7 | 5900 |
| IE Ireland | 42.6 | 24.8 | 32.6 | 5492 |
| IT Italy | 46.0 | 25.9 | 28.1 | 1538 |
| LU Luxembourg | 72.3 | 14.0 | 13.7 | 2246 |
| NL Netherlands | 37.7 | 43.4 | 18.8 | 7402 |
| NO Norway | 23.9 | 60.3 | 15.8 | 6812 |
| PL Poland | 57.3 | 7.9 | 34.8 | 6060 |
| PT Portugal | 55.8 | 16.2 | 28.1 | 5806 |
| SE Sweden | 57.8 | 21.5 | 20.8 | 7585 |
| SI Slovenia | 72.0 | 4.0 | 24.0 | 5039 |
| SK Slovakia | 67.7 | 10.7 | 21.7 | 5239 |
| TR Turkey | 27.6 | 6.4 | 66.1 | 1244 |
| UA Ukraine | 70.2 | 15.6 | 14.2 | 5532 |
| Total | 51.4 | 25.5 | 23.1 | 150854 |

Source: ESS Cumulative File 2002-2010

Appendix D. Operationalisation of economic left-right and social or cultural left-right for parties and voters

Manifesto data:

Parties: Economic left-right:

compute eclleft0=per404+per405+per409+per412+per413+per415+per504+per701.

compute ecrigh0=per401+per402+per414+per505+per702+per704.

compute eclleft0=eclleft0+ecrigh0.

compute ecrigh1=(ecrigh0/ eclleft0)*100.

Parties: Social or cultural left-right:

compute cultleft0=per103+per107+per503+per602+per604+per607.

compute cultright0=per109+per305+per601+per603+per605+per608.

compute cultleft0=cultleft0+cultright0.

compute cultright1=(cultright0/ cultleft0)*100.

ESS-data:

Voters: Economic left-right: Lrscale.

lrscale: Placement on left right scale

All rounds: In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this

scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

Voters: Social or cultural left-right: compute PC=imbgeco + imueclt + imwbent.

Name Label Question

37 imbgeco Immigration bad or good for country's economy **All rounds:** Would you say it is generally bad or good for

[country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?

38 imueclt Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants **All rounds:** And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s

cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

39 imwbent Immigrants make country worse or better place to live **All rounds:** Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by

people coming to live here from other countries?

Source: Camia and Caramani 2011; ESS Cumulative File 2002-2010

Note: High score=Right, Conservative; Low score= Left, Progressive

Notes

ⁱ The cumulative file of the European Social Survey can be downloaded from <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/downloadwizard/>. The ESS Cumulative Data Wizard gives access to cumulative data from countries that have been included in the integrated ESS files in two or more rounds.

ⁱⁱ Unfortunately, the number of involuntary part-time employed can only be determined for two rounds in the total of five rounds in the European Social Survey (namely, ESS2 and ESS5).

ⁱⁱⁱ The version of 2012 has been downloaded on: <https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/>

^{iv} These groups are: ecologist (eco), communist (com), social democratic (soc), liberal (lib), christian democrat (chr), conservative (con), nationalist (nat), agrarian (agr), ethnic-regional/special issue (eth/sip).